World Almanac of Islamism

I discovered what looks to be a fantastic resource in the making today: the American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism (currently in beta development phase) is an interactive map of the world with links, eventually by country and continent, to the various Islamist parties and groupings.  In the words of the AFPC, the Almanac “is a comprehensive resource focusing on the nature of the contemporary Islamist threat in individual countries and regions, intended to provide an accurate picture of the rise or decline of radical Islamism on a national, regional and global level.”

I’ve added a link to the Almanac on the sidebar.

British Government Confirms Identity of MAB

This isn’t exactly news, but it’s good, nonetheless, to have the Government spell it out in black and white.  From Hansard:

Mr Offord: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent reports he has received of potential links between the UK offices of the Muslim Brotherhood and (a) Hamas, (b) Islamic Jihad and (c) other organisations. [24575]

Alistair Burt: We are aware of reports which suggest that there are significant historic linkages between the Muslim Brotherhood, its overseas affiliates and Hamas. Historically the Brotherhood has presented Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement for the Palestinian people.  The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) are the Brotherhood’s representative in the UK.  MAB in the UK publically rejects violence and state that they work for wider Muslim integration into British society.

The Muslim Association of Britain rejects violence?  Oh, that Muslim Association of Britain.

H/T Dave Rich

Opposition to Khamenei is an Affront to Allah

According to the head of Iran’s Guardian Council, Ayatollah Jannati

“Denying the guardianship of the supreme leader [Ayatollah Khamenei] is the same as denying God.”

The BBC cite ‘analysts’ who claim that this is yet another attempt by Iran’s Supreme Leader to cow dissent by equating it with apostasy; a ‘crime’ which can carry the death penalty in Iran.

Global Muslim Public Opinion on Hamas, Hezbollah and Islam’s role in Politics

Pew have published some new research on Muslim opinions towards the Islamist groups Hamas and Hezbollah and, amongst other things, views on the role of Islam in public life.  The report makes for interesting, and worrying, reading as you can imagine:

Extremist groups Hamas and Hezbollah continue to receive mixed ratings from Muslim publics. However, opinions of al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, are consistently negative; only in Nigeria do Muslims offer views that are, on balance, positive toward al Qaeda and bin Laden.

It is Pew’s job to produce objective, non-partisan research, but this opening paragraph to their commentary understates what to me are some startling figures.  Firstly, we often hear about the public’s ‘mixed reaction’ to various policy initiatives, or even their ambivalence.  In some instances this might even be a controversial issue (such as lingering support for capital punishment).  In this instance, however, we’re talking about a large body of people who support genocidal terrorist organisations: according to Pew, some 38 million Nigerians express support for Hamas and al-Qa’idah, and some 35 million the Shi’ite Islamists of Hezbollah (this in spite of the fact that Nigerian Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunni).  In Egypt, some 36 million people look upon Hamas favourably, whilst 14.5 million Egyptians champion al-Qa’idah.  In avowedly secular Turkey, some 3 million, 3.8 million and 7 million Turks endorse the policies of al-Qa’idah, Hezbollah and Hamas respectively; this, in a country in the advanced stages of gaining accession to the European Union.  But perhaps the most disturbing data in the survey comes from Indonesia.  With a population approaching 250 million, Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world with some 209 million Indonesians professing faith in Islam (according to the last census) or 86% of the population.  Of this 209 million, according to Pew, 23% approve of al-Qa’idah (48 million); 39% Hamas (81.5 million); and 43% Hezbollah (90 million).

Looking at the results of two previous surveys (see Mixed Views of Hamas and Hezbollah in Largely Muslim Nations and Muslim Views of Hamas Mixed) on Muslim attitudes to Islamism, we notice a general trend of growing support, with exceptions:

• support for Hamas has doubled in Lebanon, nearly doubled in Indonesia and Turkey, and increased by over a third in Nigeria since 2007;
• support for Islamism in Egypt has fallen, with declining support particularly marked for Hezbollah;
• support for Hezbollah has increased significantly in Jordan and by 50% in Lebanon since 2009

The survey also finds that Muslims are overwhelmingly in favour of Islam’s role in their countries’ politics.  Furthermore, although the Turkish public are ambivalent towards the role Islam, of the 69% who say  religion plays a large role, 45% see it as good a thing.

Regarding democracy, majorities in most of the Muslim publics surveyed say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, though it is unclear from the survey exactly what form of democracy.  This view is especially widespread in Lebanon and in Turkey, the most Westernised countries in the Middle East with the exception of Israel.  In these two states at least three-quarters of Muslims (81% and 76%, respectively) express a preference for democratic governance.  Support for democracy is less common in Pakistan, but a plurality (42%) of Muslims in that country prefer democracy to other types of government; 15% of Pakistani Muslims say that, in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, and 21% say that, for someone like them, the kind of government their country has does not matter.

To view or download the full report in .pdf, click here.

IslamOnline becomes OnIslam

Although IslamOnline still exists (we’re still awaiting the English section mind you), a new website, brought to us by the founders of IslamOnline, is with us: OnIslam promises to be everything that the old IslamOnline was.  And best of all, they’ve brought back the only portal dedicated to Islamist movements on the net, al-Islamyoon.

You can read more on the developments that led to the change of personnel, and the setting up of OnIslam, here.

H/T GMBDR

Participation NOT Confrontation!

Participation not confrontation (مشاركة لا مغالبة).  This is the slogan adopted for the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliamentary election campaign 2010, in which Brothers, standing as independents much as they did in 2005, will contest 30% of the seats up for grabs in the Majlis ash-Shaab.  The decision to contest the elections was announced today by the Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badie (you can read his speech here).

Expect the results of the election to be used by both sides (supporters and detractors of the MB) as a litmus test for the relative success or failure of political Islam.

Muhammad Badi: “improvement and change” only “attained through jihad” and “by raising a jihadi generation”

In last week’s risâlah to the Brothers, Dr Muhammad Badi, the Supreme Guide, had this to say to those sceptical of the merits of armed ‘resistance’:

They crucially need to understand that the improvement and change that the [Muslim] nation seeks can only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life. (وما أحوجهم أن يدركوا أن الإصلاح والتغيير الذي تنشده الأمة لا يمكن تحقيقه إلا بالجهاد والتضحية وصياغة جيل مجاهد يحرص على الموت كما يحرص الأعداء على الحياة.)

Source: IkhwanOnline; IkhwanPress

There can be no doubt about where the Muslim Brotherhood stands on terrorism in order to execute its long-term goals.  Its much-vaunted renunciation of violence is but one tactic in a long-term strategy to create the conditions necessary for Islamist hegemony in the Middle East and elsewhere.  One cannot be a member of this organisation and be considered a ‘moderate’.

H/T MEMRI 

Carnegie’s Egyptian Election Site

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have set up a micro-site to cover the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections.  It’s very informative; even if it does sanitise the Brotherhood to a certain extent, and there’s an intriguing interview with Dr Essam el-Arian (the reform-minded Brother much-loved by Western commentators sympathetic to the movement), conducted back in May, posted there.

Some Reading on Political Islamism

Soner Cagaptay, who is always worth reading on all things Turkish, has an article today at the Washington Institute speculating on Turkey’s future direction.  His thesis is basically that Turkey continues to flatter to decieve under the Islamist AKP: whilst the country entered EU accession negotiations under the party back in 2005, seeking EU membership was merely a pretext for sanitising the party’s Islamist brand of politics.  By contrast, some see the AKP’s commitment to Islamism as ‘one of values and identity rather than Islamic law’ pointing to the recent constitutional referendum victory that has moved Turkey away from intervention by the so-called ‘guardians of secularism’, the armed forces, but towards a judiciary likely to be more amenable to the AKP government.  Whatever your view, those with an interest in Islamic politics and the future direction of political parties and quasi-political organisations with Islam as their guiding principle will be watching the machinations of the AKP over the next few years with interest.

Elsewhere, although his passing was not remarked by this blog, I feel that now would be a suitable time to draw readers’ attention to this study by Martin Kramer on Grand Ayatollah Husayn Fadlallah.

Between Religion and Politics

The title of this post is also the title of a new book co-authored by Amr Hamzawy and Nathan Brown (it’s also the raison d’être of this blog).  The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace held an event featuring the authors last Wednesday, whilst the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) kindly provided an overview of the discussion (see here for the full report).  According to POMED, Brown had this to say:

He then explained that the conversation would focus on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas, two groups that, while outwardly similar, were inherently different.

Different?  How can this be?  Both the MB in Egypt and Palestinian Hamas are part of the same broader Islamist movement.  Indeed, Hamas is part of the Global Muslim Brotherhood.  Of course, in their different contexts, both organisations pursue different tactics: Hamas, as a genocidal terrorist organisation, has the freedom to institute Islamic law within its Gaza fiefdom and conduct terrorist operations against Israel; the Egyptian MB are a proscribed organisation and must work within the confines of a closed, authoritarian system where their members are frequently arrested and imprisoned – it is simply not in the MB’s interests to pursue the same guerilla campaign for which they were banned in the first place.   Were the situation reversed, there is no doubt in my mind that the Brothers would revert to type and install an Islamic theocracy.  Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are the same movement with the same ideology and goals.

The Brotherhood seeks peaceful change, while Hamas has an armed wing. The Brotherhood focuses primarily on Egyptian issues, rarely stepping into foreign policy, while Hamas is the center of international attention.

Again, any perceived differences in tactics are purely illusory.  The Egyptian MB had (see p.30 and passim) and continues to possess an armed wing.  The Brotherhood also maintain a network of contacts and sympathisers throughout the West, such as in London, where a political bureau and publishing house is to be found.  Yes, Hamas, like the Egyptian MB, concentrates primarily on the dynamics of their own political context; but both organisations enjoy a network of supporters and sympathetic ideologues that act in accord with the Islamic movement as a whole.